Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals sought to appear as Republican candidates for the Catoosa County Commission in the May 2024 primary election. The local county Republican Party (CCRP), believing that existing state law and party rules did not sufficiently protect against non-Republicans qualifying, adopted a new rule requiring candidates to interview with the CCRP executive committee and obtain a “qualifying affidavit.” When four candidates failed to secure this affidavit and were denied qualification, they brought suit against the CCRP and certain individual members, arguing the rule was unauthorized and prevented their lawful qualification.Reviewing the case, the Superior Court of Catoosa County granted the candidates a temporary restraining order, then a permanent injunction prohibiting the CCRP from enforcing the affidavit rule. After the CCRP persisted in refusing to qualify the candidates, the court found the CCRP and several members in contempt, awarded attorney fees to the candidates, and extended the injunction. The court also awarded attorney fees against certain CCRP members who were not named parties in the litigation. Appeals followed: the CCRP and named members challenged the injunction, contempt finding, and attorney fees; nonparty CCRP members appealed the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the injunction, holding that county-level party organizations are not authorized by Georgia law to create independent candidate qualification rules beyond those established by the state party and statute. The permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule was upheld, as was the contempt finding and attorney fee award against most named appellants. However, the contempt finding against two individuals was reversed for lack of evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal by nonparty CCRP members for failure to follow the required discretionary appellate procedure for attorney fee awards. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary election. Under state law, only certain officials—including the Lieutenant Governor—could create a special “leadership committee” that was permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds in direct coordination with their campaigns. Burt Jones, the Lieutenant Governor, formed such a committee to support his own campaign. Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Secretary of State, also ran in the primary, but his supporters—including Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid political action committee (PAC) chaired by Raffensperger—were subject to contribution and coordination restrictions and could not operate a leadership committee.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging these campaign finance restrictions as violating the First Amendment. The group sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contribution and coordination limits against it, specifically so it could support Raffensperger’s campaign during the ongoing primary. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Safe Affordable Georgia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking expedited review.By the time the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal, the 2026 primary election was over and Raffensperger’s campaign had ended. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the case was moot because the court could no longer provide meaningful relief relating to the completed election. The court also found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that the same dispute would recur involving the same parties. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

Several candidates, including Georgia’s Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State, sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary. Under Georgia law, only certain officeholders, such as the incumbent Lieutenant Governor, could establish “leadership committees,” which allowed them to raise and spend unlimited funds and coordinate directly with their campaigns. Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid PAC chaired by Secretary Raffensperger, could not coordinate with his campaign or raise unlimited funds to support him.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against state officials, arguing that Georgia’s campaign finance scheme violated the First Amendment by treating it differently from leadership committees. The PAC sought a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of contribution and coordination limits against it, aiming to support Raffensperger in the ongoing primary. The district court denied the request for emergency injunctive relief, and the PAC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the primary election concluded and Raffensperger’s campaign ended. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that, because the election was over and the PAC’s requested relief focused specifically on the 2026 primary, federal courts could no longer offer meaningful relief. The court held that the case was moot and did not qualify for the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception because there was no reasonable expectation the same situation would recur for the same party. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "USA v. Waeckerle" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a proposed Nebraska constitutional amendment, the “Fairness for Girls” initiative, which seeks to establish constitutional protections for sex-separate athletics, ensuring equal access to athletic opportunities for females. The sponsors filed the initiative text and an object statement with the Nebraska Secretary of State, then submitted petition signatures. The object statement was printed on the petition and signature sheets, and the full text was available to signers. The Secretary of State certified the initiative for placement on the 2026 general election ballot.Cara Ullman filed a complaint in the District Court for Lancaster County, alleging the initiative’s object statement did not comply with Nebraska statutory requirements, specifically Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1401 and 32-1405. Ullman claimed the statement failed to describe the legal effect and the object sought to be secured. She requested an injunction to prevent the Secretary from placing the initiative on the ballot. After motions and a hearing, the district court dismissed Ullman’s complaint on the merits, holding that the object statement was a concise summary of the legal effect and object, and that the petition substantially complied with statutory requirements.The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the legal issues, focusing on whether the initiative's object statement satisfied statutory requirements. The Court held that the object statement met the requirement to concisely state the legal effect of the filing and the object sought, noting it was consistent with the initiative’s text and not misleading. The Court clarified that Nebraska law does not require the object statement to summarize all major provisions, only to identify the overall purpose. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the legal sufficiency of the initiative and denying the requested injunction. View "Ullman v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Kristina Gulley, who previously served as justice of the peace for District 10 in Pulaski County, Arkansas, sought reelection after having been disqualified in earlier proceedings due to two prior misdemeanor hot-check convictions from 1997 and 2003. Multiple prior legal actions had resulted in findings that these convictions constituted “infamous crimes” under article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution, rendering her ineligible to run for or hold public office. Despite these rulings, Gulley again filed as a candidate in the 2026 primary election. Registered voters in the district challenged her eligibility, seeking a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to prevent her name from appearing on the ballot and to prohibit counting any votes cast for her.The Pulaski County Circuit Court held an expedited hearing, denied Gulley’s requests for a continuance and for relief from judgment, and reaffirmed her ineligibility based on the prior convictions. The court found that neither the sealing of her record nor a gubernatorial pardon restored her eligibility to run for office, and it ordered the Board of Election Commissioners not to certify her as a candidate or count votes for her. Gulley appealed, challenging the circuit court’s findings on factual and constitutional grounds. However, she did not obtain a stay of the court’s order or the certification of the election results.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that the appeal was moot because the March 2026 primary election had already occurred, and the election results had been certified. The court held that no effective relief could be granted as to the election in question, and none of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the motion to dismiss the appeal as moot and dismissed the case. View "GULLEY v. JEFFREY" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations dedicated to increasing voter participation, especially among underrepresented groups, sent mail ballot applications to Kansas voters during the 2020 election. These mailings included applications that had been partially prefilled with voter information obtained from public and commercial sources. Due to outdated or inaccurate data, many applications contained errors, leading to voter confusion and administrative burdens for local election officials who had to process erroneous or duplicate applications and respond to concerned voters.Following this experience, the Kansas legislature enacted a law prohibiting private entities from mailing partially prefilled advance ballot applications to registered voters. The nonprofits challenged the law in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that it infringed on their First Amendment rights. The district court initially enjoined enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to apply intermediate scrutiny unless it found the law was enacted with an improper purpose. On remand, the district court found that the Kansas legislature had acted with an improper purpose, concluded that strict scrutiny should apply, and again enjoined the law.On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding improper legislative intent, as there was no sufficient evidence in the law’s text, justifications, or legislative history to support that conclusion. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit found that the law served significant governmental interests—minimizing voter confusion, facilitating efficient election administration, and fostering confidence in elections—and was narrowly tailored to those interests without substantially burdening protected speech. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

A candidate who won the Republican Party nomination for state representative in Ohio’s 89th House District withdrew his candidacy after the primary election. Under Ohio law, a district committee composed of the chairpersons and secretaries of the Republican Party county central committees within the district was authorized to select a replacement candidate. The committee met privately, excluding the public and a board of elections member, and chose Caleb Stidham, who was himself a member and chair of the Erie County Republican Party, as the replacement. The committee certified Stidham’s nomination to the Erie County Board of Elections.When the board of elections considered certifying Stidham for the ballot, it split evenly. The two members against certification cited concerns about the closed committee meeting and Stidham’s participation in his own selection. The Secretary of State, as authorized by statute, broke the tie in favor of certifying Stidham. Shortly after, Carl Koebel, an elector in the district, filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to prevent Stidham’s certification and requesting removal from the ballot, arguing that the committee violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed Koebel’s complaint, including arguments regarding the verification affidavit and standing. Ultimately, the court denied the writ on the grounds of laches, finding Koebel had unreasonably delayed for 25 days after the Secretary of State’s decision, thereby prejudicing the board and the Secretary due to statutory deadlines for ballot printing and absentee ballot distribution. The court did not reach the merits of Koebel’s Open Meetings Act claim, instead holding that the delay barred relief. The court also granted Koebel’s motion to submit a supplemental affidavit but denied his request for attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Koebel v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute regarding the eligibility of a candidate for the Ohio general election ballot. Judge Nathan Manning was nominated in the Republican Party primary as a candidate for state representative for the 52nd Ohio House District. Subsequently, a vacancy arose in the Ninth District Court of Appeals due to a judge’s retirement, and Governor Mike DeWine appointed Manning to fill the vacancy until a successor could be elected. Manning withdrew his state representative candidacy and was later selected by a Republican Party district committee as the candidate for the unexpired appellate court term. Mark Derrig, an elector, challenged this selection, arguing that Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 3513.31(I) prohibited Manning’s selection because he had already been nominated for a different office in the primary election.After Derrig raised his objection, the Summit County Board of Elections convened a hearing but reached a tie vote on whether to remove Manning from the ballot. Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose broke the tie, allowing Manning’s candidacy to stand. Derrig then filed an original action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel removal of Manning’s name from the ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed Derrig’s claim and interpreted R.C. 3513.31(I) in the context of Ohio’s election statutes. The court held that the statute does not prevent a party district committee from selecting a candidate for a remaining unexpired term in a judicial office, even if that candidate was previously nominated for a different office in the primary election. Therefore, Derrig did not establish a clear legal right to Manning’s removal or a clear legal duty for respondents to provide such relief. The court denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Derrig v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, citizen sponsors of three ballot initiatives for the 2024 Montana election cycle, challenged several provisions of Senate Bill 93, enacted by the 2023 Montana Legislature, which revised laws governing the statewide initiative process. Among the challenged provisions were: a $3,700 filing fee for submitting initiative proposals (with a possible hardship waiver), a prohibition on resubmitting substantially similar measures for four years after defeat, authorization for legislative interim committees to vote on proposed measures and place the result on the petition, and granting the Attorney General authority to review the substantive legality of initiatives. When the plaintiffs submitted their initiatives, the Secretary of State’s office required payment of the filing fee or proof of hardship; the plaintiffs withheld payment, and their proposals were rejected.The case was filed in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against eleven provisions of SB 93. The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on four claims, declaring the four challenged provisions unconstitutional, and denied relief on seven others. The parties then stipulated to dismiss all remaining claims not resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor. The District Court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and the denial of attorney fees. The Court held that the Legislature may not impose requirements for ballot measures exceeding the conditions set forth in the Montana Constitution. Specifically, the Court affirmed that the four-year resubmission ban, the legislative committee vote on petitions, the $3,700 filing fee, and the Attorney General’s substantive review authority all unconstitutionally impaired the people’s reserved initiative power and were facially invalid. The Court also affirmed the District Court’s denial of attorney fees, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Ellingson v. State" on Justia Law